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THE ANIMALISTIC GULLET AND THE GODLIKE SOUL:
REFRAMING SACRIFICE IN MIDRASH
LEVITICUS RABBAH
Mira Balberg
Abstract: This article proposes an analysis of two homiletic units in
the Palestinian Midrash Leviticus Rabbah, which revolve around bib-
lical chapters pertaining to sacrifices. A theme that pervades these
units is that of eating as an animalistic activity that often entails
moral depravity. In contrast, the act of sacrificing is constructed in
these units as one in which one is willing to give up one’s own nourish-
ment, and in a sense one’s own “soul,” in order to offer it to God. Many
of the motifs used to vilify eating in the Midrash can be traced in mor-
alistic Greek, Roman, and early Christian diatribes preaching for mod-
eration in eating or for asceticism; the homilists in Leviticus Rabbah,
however, utilize these popular motifs in order to present sacrifice as the
spiritual contrary of eating, and thus to give the obsolete practice of
sacrifice cultural cachet and compelling meanings.
The gradual decline and ultimate demise of sacrificial rituals in ancient
Mediterranean religions is undoubtedly a critical and defining feature of
the period often referred to as late antiquity (150–750 CE).1 The destruction
of the Jerusalem temple in 70 CE, the absence of prescribed sacrificial
practices in early Christian teachings (which ultimately evolved into an utter
rejection of sacrifice),2 and finally the rapid marginalization of traditional
Roman sacrificial cults following the Christianization of the Roman Empire,3
all played a role in turning what used to be a pivot of piety in antiquity into a
thing of the past. Thus, in late antiquity, new and ostensibly nonsacrificial
forms of worship and religious devotion were constantly being conceived and
I am grateful to Ellen Muehlberger, Yair Lipshitz, Tim DeBold, and the anonymous reader for
their thoughtful comments and insights, which have greatly improved this article.
1. Here I am following a very broad definition of the span of this period, which was proposed by
Peter Brown in his influential The World of Late Antiquity (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971). For a
survey of the history of the term “late antiquity” and the unique characteristics of this period, see Philip
Rousseau’s introduction in Companion to Late Antiquity, ed. Philip Rousseau (Oxford: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), xviii–xxii.
2. Daniel C. Ullucci, The Christian Rejection of Animal Sacrifice (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2012).
3. On the decline of animal sacrifices in the Roman Empire in the course of the fourth and fifth
centuries CE, see Scott Bradbury, “Julian’s Pagan Revival and the Decline of Blood Sacrifice,” Phoenix
49, no. 4 (1995): 331–56; Michelle R. Salzman, “The End of Public Sacrifice: Changing Definitions of
Sacrifice in Post-Constantinian Rome and Italy,” in Ancient Mediterranean Sacrifice, ed. Jennifer
Wright Knust and Zsuzsanna Várhelyi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 167–86.
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propagated.4 Nevertheless, while sacrificial practices as such became more and
more scarce, sacrificial rhetoric and imagery did not disappear, but rather
became powerful tools for shaping and conveying new and sometimes radical reli-
gious ideas and ideals, revealing the enduring eminence of sacrifice as a critical
structuring principle in both Jewish and Christian thought.5 As Guy Stroumsa
cogently put it, both Judaism and Christianity were formed throughout late anti-
quity as sacrificial religions without sacrifice.6
Scholars who have explored the rabbinic responses to the destruction of the
Jerusalem temple, and thereby to the elimination of Jewish sacrificial rituals, have
shown how the rabbis presented the various religious practices that they cham-
pioned—most notably prayer and Torah study, but also charity and certain
forms of asceticism—as apt substitutes for sacrificial offerings.7 Indeed, many rab-
binic sources postulated that one who engages in one of these practices is con-
sidered as though he or she had offered an animal on the altar. The governing
paradigm in studies of responses to the destruction is that the rabbis rhetorically
used the inherited, scripturally based prestige of sacrificial offerings in order to
elevate their own notions of piety and devotion, and in order to introduce new
modes of religious engagement as equal, if not superior, to traditional forms of
worship. While this direction of appropriation—namely, rabbinic modes of reli-
gious practice “borrowing” their esteem from sacrifices—is certainly dominant
in rabbinic texts, in this article I wish to show that a reverse appropriation, in
which sacrifices are valorized through reference to ideals more contemporaneous
with the rabbis, is also at work in rabbinic literature.
Focusing on two consecutive textual units in Midrash Leviticus Rabbah, a
Palestinian collection of homiletic materials on the book of Leviticus, which is
commonly dated to the fifth or sixth century CE,8 this article will argue that the
4. Guy Stroumsa, The End of the Sacrifice: Religious Transformations in Late Antiquity
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).
5. Stroumsa, End of the Sacrifice, 56–83; Moshe Halbertal, On Sacrifice (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2012), 7.
6. Stroumsa, End of Sacrifice, 78.
7. For a general overview of Jewish responses to the destruction of the temple, see Robert Gold-
enberg, “The Destruction of the Jerusalem Temple: Its Meaning and Its Consequences,” in The Cam-
bridge History of Judaism: Volume Four, The Late Roman-Rabbinic Period, ed. Steven T. Katz
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 191–205. For several notable works presenting rab-
binic “substitutes” for the temple cult after the destruction, see Ben-Zion Rosenfeld, “Sage and Temple
in Rabbinic Thought after the Destruction of the Second Temple,” Journal for the Study of Judaism in
the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Period 28, no. 4 (1997): 437–64; Michael Fishbane, The Exegetical
Imagination: On Jewish Thought and Theology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998),
123–35; Jonathan Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple: Symbolism and Supersessionism in
the Study of Ancient Judaism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 198–211; most recently,
see Halbertal, On Sacrifice, 37–53.
8. On this midrash, its time, and its place, see Hanokh Albeck, “Midrash Vayikra Rabbah,” in
The Louis Ginsberg Jubilee Volume (New York: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1946),
Hebrew Section, 25–43; Mordecai Margaliot, Midrash Vayikra Rabbah, vol. 5 (New York: Jewish
Theological Seminary, 1993); H.L Strack and G. Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and
Midrash, trans. Marcus Bockmuehl (Cambridge: T & T Clark, 1991), 288–91.
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rabbis were interested not only in solidifying their own ideals through comparison
to sacrifice, but also in reinforcing the idea of sacrifice itself as a central scriptural
theme, by associating it with ideals that both they and their Greco-Roman and
Christian contemporaries held high. More specifically, the creators of Leviticus
Rabbah equate the offering of animal or grain sacrifices with voluntary relinquish-
ment of food, while at the same time vilifying the consumption of food as entailing
treachery, theft, and animal-like behavior. This insistent vilification of food and
eating strongly resonates with the imagery and rhetoric used in diatribes against
gluttony and in praise of moderation or asceticism in the rabbis’ surrounding
culture.
Thus, the rabbis in the midrash construct the act of sacrifice as diametrically
opposed to the act of eating, and purposefully denigrate the latter in order to
elevate the former. They establish this opposition mainly through a continuous
word play between two meanings of the Hebrew word nefesh, which recurs in
these midrashic units, a word that can mean either “gullet” or “soul.” The nefesh-
gullet that consumes food is disparaged as animalistic in nature, whereas the
nefesh-soul that offers sacrifices while giving up its own food is praised as
godlike. Hence, the act of sacrificing is constructed as a form of transformation
of a person from an animalistic gullet to a godlike soul. In this presentation of
sacrifice as a contrast to eating, the rabbis employ a culturally established negative
attitude towards gluttony in order to valorize the increasingly obsolete notion of
sacrifice, and to inject it with new and relevant meanings.
Midrash Leviticus Rabbah has long been noted for its unique way of
addressing the highly technical—and at times tedious—topics in the biblical
book of Leviticus. Attempting to create colorful and compelling orations9 on a
book that consists almost exclusively of detailed sacrificial and ritual manuals,
the creators of this midrash chose to approach the biblical text not through the
established rabbinic method of verse-by-verse exegesis, but rather through an
identification of key words or themes that they used as springboards for the devel-
opment of much broader topics.10 Thus, for instance, instead of expounding on the
9. A common view among scholars was that the homilies contained in the midrash originally
emerged in the setting of the synagogue, and were used during public sermons adjacent to the
weekly Torah reading. This theory was first proposed by Leopold Zunz, Gottesdienstliche Vorträge
der Juden (Berlin: A. Asher, 1832), and was enthusiastically endorsed by Joseph Heinemann in his
Derashot be-z.ibbur bi-tkufat ha-talmud (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1970). This hypothesis has been
widely challenged in more recent scholarship, most prominently by Richard Sarason, “Toward a
New Agendum for the Study of Midrashic Literature,” in Studies in Aggadah, Targum, and Jewish
Liturgy in Memory of Joseph Heinemann, ed. Jakob J. Petuchowski and Ezra Fleischer (Jerusalem:
Magnes, 1981), 55–73; Sarason, “The Petih. ot in Leviticus Rabba: Oral Homilies or Redactional Con-
structions?” Journal of Jewish Studies 33 (1982): 557–65. For a helpful survey of the state of the debate
on this question see Burton Visotzky, Golden Bells and Pomegranates: Studies in Midrash Leviticus
Rabbah (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 10–11.
10. On the unique midrashic technique of Leviticus Rabbah see Jacob Neusner, The Integrity of
Leviticus Rabbah: The Problem of the Autonomy of a Rabbinic Document (Atlanta: Scholars Press,
1985); Visotzky, Golden Bells; more recently, see Tamar Jacobowitz, Leviticus Rabbah and the Spir-
itualization of the Laws of Impurity (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2011).
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rules pertaining to the impurity of the parturient woman, the midrash presents a
collection of traditions on the miraculous aspects of pregnancy and childbirth
and God’s involvement in the processes of conception and gestation,11 and
instead of scrutinizing the ritual kindling of the Tabernacle’s lamp, the midrash
develops the theme of light and its divine significance.12 Through such homiletic
choices, the creators of the midrash effectively generated what David Stern called
a “spiritualized understanding” of the biblical book.13 The urge for such “spiritua-
lization” of the Levitical materials derived not only from their somewhat dry and
taxing character, but also, and perhaps especially, from the fact that the most pro-
minent theme of the book of Leviticus—namely, the sanctuary and its rituals—was
practically obsolete, as noted above, in the world of Palestinian Jews in the fifth
and sixth centuries CE. Nevertheless, the fact that the book of Leviticus was
part of the regular cycle of Torah readings in synagogues, and more broadly the
fact that sacrificial imagery and vocabulary had such a prominent role in biblical
and postbiblical religious language, compelled the later rabbis to find meaningful
ways to engage with the theme of ritual sacrifice and sanctuary worship. In explor-
ing the reframing of sacrifices in two parashot (portions, corresponding with the
weekly portions of Torah reading)14 of Leviticus Rabbah, I hope to make a con-
tribution to the study of this unique midrash by analyzing and demonstrating
some of the complex and rich ways in which its creators reinterpret biblical
ideas and institutions to make them resonate with their own cultural world.
Finally, this article seeks to bring to the fore the intricate connection between
sacrifice and food, a theme that has not yet been investigated in the study of the
rabbinic construction of sacrifice, and to offer some directions for thinking
about this relationship in the postsacrificial context of late antiquity. To be sure,
throughout the ancient world sacrifices were not only media of reciprocal com-
munication with the divine, but also opportunities to feast.15 To offer a sacrifice
was, in the majority of cases, to produce food (whether for oneself, for the
priests, or for both),16 and many of the practices associated with sacrifice were
11. Vayikra Rabbah, Tazri‘a, par. 14, to Leviticus 12:1 (ed. Margaliot, 2:295–318).
12. Vayikra Rabbah, ’Emor, par. 31, to Leviticus 24:1–4 (ed. Margaliot, 4:714–33).
13. David Stern, “Vayikra Rabbah and My Life in Midrash,” Prooftexts 21, no. 1 (2001): 32.
14. The Palestinian custom of weekly Torah readings, which was practiced at the time of the
compilation of Leviticus Rabbah, was not based on an annual cycle in which the entire Pentateuch
is read though the course of one year. Rather, as Shlomo Naeh showed, the Palestinian cycle was
designed to take three and a half years, so that the Torah reading would be completed twice in the
course of seven years. See Shlomo Naeh, “Sidre kri’at ha-torah be-’erez. yisra’el: ‘iyyun meh.udash,”
Tarbiz 67 (1998): 167–87.
15. John Scheid, An Introduction to Roman Religion, trans. Janet Lloyd (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2003), 93–6. See also Dennis E. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist: The Banquet
in the Early Christian World (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003); Peter Altmann, Festive Meals in
Ancient Israel: Deuteronomy’s Identity Politics in Their Ancient Near Eastern Context (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter, 2011).
16. Jonathan Z. Smith, “The Domestication of Sacrifice,” reprinted in Relating Religion: Essays
in the Study of Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 145–59.
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notably culinary in essence.17 The biblical ritual system, which assumes a strong
identification of the very act of eating meat with sacrificial practices, is not excep-
tional in this regard,18 and echoes of the identification of all meat with sacrifices
are discernible in rabbinic literature as well.19
In the classical world the two practices of sacrificing and eating were closely
intertwined, but how did the connection between eating and sacrificing evolve in
late antiquity, when food (and notably meat) was consumed regularly but no sacri-
ficial system existed? In parashot 3 and 4 of Leviticus Rabbah we find a particu-
larly interesting way of restructuring the connection between eating and sacrificing
in a world without sacrifices, such that these two activities are decisively and bla-
tantly dissociated from one another. The rabbis make clear that sacrificial offerings
could serve as food; however, their pious offerers have chosen not to use them as
nourishment but rather to bring them to God. In other words, the homilists in Levi-
ticus Rabbah use the association of food and sacrifice to create a diametrical oppo-
sition between the two, and to offer a model in which the act of sacrifice acquires
spiritual significance insofar as it entails giving one’s food to God rather than to
one’s belly. My reading of Leviticus Rabbah, then, seeks to shed light on some
alimentary aspects of the notion of sacrifice as it continues to develop in rabbinic
culture, and thereby, hopefully, to open a gateway for further consideration of the
connections between food and sacrifice in late antique religious cultures.
LEVITICUS RABBAH 3: THE POOR PERSON’S OFFERING AND THE BIRD’S CROP
Leviticus Rabbah is, in its essence, an anthological compilation: each one of
its thirty-seven parashot (homiletic units that correspond with particular segments
of the Torah) consists of a wide variety of self-contained rabbinic traditions. While
these various traditions are often creatively and selectively redacted so as to work
towards one overarching theme that is prominent in the parashah as a whole,20 for
the most part they are not dependent on one another.21 The specific homiletic
17. Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, eds., The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks,
trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
18. The book of Leviticus prohibits any slaughter of cattle or flock not preceded by ritual sacri-
fice (Leviticus 17:1–10); see Baruch J. Schwartz, “Profane Slaughter and the Integrity of the Priestly
Code,” Hebrew Union College Annual 67 (1996): 15–42. In contrast, the book of Deuteronomy
permits such nonritual slaughter and the consumption of unconsecrated meat, but makes the point
that it is primarily intended for people who cannot make it to the chosen place of worship (Deuteron-
omy 12:20–29). See Bernard Levinson, Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 23–52.
19. This view is reflected in a rabbinic tradition regarding some of the more extreme reactions to
the destruction of the Jerusalem temple, which included a refusal to eat meat since sacrifices are no
longer offered at the altar; see T. Sotah 15:10–11 and B. Bava Batra 60a; cf. 2 Baruch 10:9–10, B.
Pesah. im 109a.
20. The thematic unity of the parashot in Leviticus Rabbah was especially emphasized by
Joseph Heinemann, “‘Omanut ha-kompoziz. iah be-midrash vayikra rabbah,” Ha-sifrut 2 (1971):
808–34.
21. David Stern, “Anthology and Polysemy in ClassicalMidrash,” in The Anthology in Jewish Lit-
erature, ed. David Stern (New York: Oxford University Press), 108–40; Visotzky, Golden Bells, 10–22.
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thread in parashot 3 and 4, on which this article will focus, cannot, it should
be stressed, be traced in each and every one of the traditions that constitute
these parashot; rather it functions as a leitmotif within selected traditions and,
more broadly, in these parashot’s overall structure and logic. I shall thus not
present a detailed translation and exposition of the two parashot in full, but
rather focus only on the ways in which the leitmotif of gullet/soul and food/sacri-
fice plays out in the midrashic materials.22
Each parashah in Leviticus Rabbah centers around one biblical verse from
the book of Leviticus, which serves as a recurring point of reference throughout
the parashah as a whole. In parashah 3, the core verse is Leviticus 2:1, “When
a person [nefesh] presents an offering of cereal unto the Lord,” whereas in para-
shah 4 the core verse is Leviticus 4:2, “when a person [nefesh] unwittingly incurs
guilt.” For the homilists, the key word in both these verses is nefesh, and it is
through the dual meaning of this word that they make their main homiletic
move. In biblical Hebrew, the word nefesh literally means throat or gullet, but
since the throat is the place in the body in which life was thought to be located,
the word nefesh also acquired a metonymic meaning of a living person in
general, and by way of extrapolation, of the principle of life itself, commonly
identified as the soul.23 Put differently, in biblical Hebrew the word nefesh can
be read either physically, as pertaining to a part of body—and one which is
closely associated with food and eating—or spiritually, as the entity that
bestows the powers of reason and deliberation on the body. In rabbinic literature,
the word nefesh is used almost exclusively to denote either a living creature or the
force of life,24 but there are nonetheless several indications in rabbinic texts that
the rabbis were quite familiar with the corporeal meaning of the word.25 The
22. All citations and references are according to Mordecai Margaliot’s edition. I have also con-
sulted Chaim Milikowsky’s online synoptic edition at http://www.biu.ac.il/js/midrash/VR/. All trans-
lations are mine.
23. Ludwig Koehler andWalter Baumgartner, The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Tes-
tament, 3rd ed., vol.1 (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 711–13; see also Mayer Gruber, “Hebrew ‘da’abôn nepes,’
‘Dryness of Throat’: From Symptom to Literary Convention,” Vetus Testamentum 37, no. 3 (1987):
365–69. A similar range of meanings, from the physical throat to a living being or self, can be
traced in the Akkadian usages of the word napishtu; see The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Insti-
tute of the University of Chicago (CAD) N 296a–303b. See also Hayim ben Yosef Tawil, An Akkadian
Lexical Companion for Biblical Hebrew (Jersey City: Ktav, 2009), 244–46.
24. On the rabbinic concept of nefesh or “soul” see Ephraim E. Urbach, H. azal: ’Emunot
ve-de‘ot (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1969), 190–226; more recently, see Ishay Rosen-Zvi, Guf ve-nefesh
ba-hagut ha-yehudit ha-kedumah (Ben-Shemen: Modan, 2012), 59–67.
25. It is difficult to find rabbinic usage of the word nefesh itself that unequivocally refers to
gullet: although there are quite a few places in which this is most plausibly the meaning of the word
(as I will suggest in my reading of Leviticus Rabbah below), a metaphorical understanding of “life”
or “soul” is usually also plausible (see, for example, Y. Terumot 8:1, 45c, in which disgusting foodstuffs
are referred to as things that “make one’s nefesh recoil.”). However, we do find several rabbinic refer-
ences to the physical throat that use the construction bet nefesh. For example, bird carrion is said to
convey impurity to the one who eats it when it reaches one’s bet nefesh (Sifra, ’Ah.arei mot, par.8,
per. 11.2, to Leviticus 17:15). Similarly, the biblical ordinance “And you shall afflict your souls/
gullets (ve-‘innitem ’et nafshotekhem)” is explained in the Sifra as follows: “let this affliction be in
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homilists in both parashot, as I will suggest, play with the two meanings of nefesh
to create a contrast between the physical gullet, presented as the location of moral
atrocities, and the soul, which is explicitly said to be free of the need to eat.
Let us begin with Leviticus Rabbah 3. As is the custom of this midrash,
while the point of departure of the parashah is the biblical verse that commences
the elaboration of rules pertaining to cereal offerings, the homilists do not actually
elaborate on the particularities of the cereal offering, but rather develop a specific
theme that arises from the topic of cereal offerings more broadly—in this case, the
fact that it is a form of offering usually brought by the poor who cannot afford
animal sacrifices. The overarching theme of the parashah, which has been
noted by scholars for its relatively high level of cohesion,26 is the value of poor
persons’ offerings and sacrifices, and the merit of their devotion to God more
generally.
The first three units of the parashah are of the literary pattern most typical of
Palestinian midrash, a pattern commonly known as petih. ta (pl. petih. tot), in which
the homilist chooses a verse located in a distant part of the Hebrew Bible and art-
fully develops a connection between the distant verse and the local Torah verse
around which the parashah revolves.27 In our case, the local Torah verse, to
which the homilists eventually return, is “When a person presents an offering of
cereal unto the Lord” (Leviticus 2:1).
The first petih. ta (3.1) departs from the verse “Better is a handful of gratifica-
tion than two fistfuls of labor which is pursuit of wind” (Ecclesiastes 4:6). This
verse is used to invoke the notion that a small quantity of something worthwhile
is preferable to a large portion of lesser quality, ultimately leading—after
suggesting multiple examples to demonstrate this idea—to the statement “the
Holy One blessed be He said: a handful of the poor man’s voluntary cereal offering
is more desirable to me than two fistfuls of the congregation’s fine incense, for the
latter is used for atonement and the former is not used for atonement [i.e., has no
aspect of sin to it].”28 The second petih. ta (3.2) departs from the verse “You who
fear the Lord, praise Him… for He did not scorn nor did He spurn the plea of the
poor” (Psalms 22:24–25). Following this verse, the unit makes the point that not
only does God not dismiss the prayer of those of a more lowly status, He in fact
heeds it first. The verse from Psalms is connected to the verse from Leviticus
the place of your soul/gullet (be-bet nafshotekhem), and which [affliction] is that? [Refraining from]
eating and drinking” (Sifra, ’Ah.arei mot, par. 5, per. 7.3, to Leviticus 16:31; See also Y. Yoma, 8:1
[44d]; B. Yoma 74a; B. Nedarim 81b). In a similar vein, in the Palestinian Talmud an adornment
that is placed on a woman’s neck is referred to as “that which is placed on bet ha-nefesh” (Y.
Shabbat 6:4 [8b]).
26. Heinemann, “‘Omanut ha-kompoziz. iah”; Norman J. Cohen, “Leviticus Rabbah, Parashah
3: An Example of a Classic Rabbinic Homily,” Jewish Quarterly Review 72, no. 1 (1981): 18–31.
27. For a helpful explanation of the genre of petih. ta, see Stern, “Anthology and Polysemy,”
129–32. Cf. Joseph Heinemann, “The Proem in the Aggadic Midrashim,” Scripta Hierosolymitana
22 (1971): 100–22.
28. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:59). The entire petih. ta
appears, with slight changes, in Kohelet Rabbah 4.6.
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through the statement “in the same way that He did not scorn his [=the poor man’s]
prayer, so He does not scorn his offering.”29 Finally, the third petih. ta (3.3) departs
from the verse “Let the wicked give up his ways, the sinful man his plans, let him
turn back to the Lord and he will pardon him” (Isaiah 55:7). The verse is used to
make the point that a cereal offering is highly effective for pleading forgiveness
from God.30
Whereas two of the three petih. tot, insofar as they are structured to refer back
to Leviticus 2:1, specifically focus on the cereal offering as a characteristic offer-
ing of the poor, the remainder of the parashah ties together the cereal offering with
the offering most commonly identified with the poor—the bird offering31—and
uses both these offerings concomitantly to convey the message of God’s prefer-
ence for the meager offerings of the poor. The bird offering, however, is addressed
in the biblical passage that precedes the one that discusses cereal offerings (Levi-
ticus 1:14–17), and thus the homilist must “backtrack” in order to integrate this
topic into the discussion. The midrashic unit that provides the transition from
cereal offering to bird offering (3.4) focuses on the biblical requirement that
before a bird is offered on the altar its crop (i.e., its esophagus or gullet) be
removed. This unit is central to the gullet/soul motif in these parashot, and thus
shall be brought here in full:
(3.4a) What is written above of the matter [=immediately before the rules per-
taining to cereal offerings]?—“He shall remove its crop with its feathers”32
[Leviticus 1:16]. R. Tanh.um b. H. anilai said: that bird flutters and flies all
over the world and eats in every direction [=everything], and eats of stolen
and robbed items; [therefore] the Holy One, blessed be He, said: since the
crop [zefek] is filled with stolen and robbed items, let it not draw near
the altar. But [in contrast] a domestic animal [behemah] is nourished at the
manger of its owner and it does not eat in every direction, therefore one sacri-
fices all of it [=without removing any part], for which it was said [regarding
domestic animal sacrifice] “and the priest shall turn the whole [’et ha-kol] into
smoke on the altar as a burnt offering” [Leviticus 1:9].33
The point made here is that God commands to distance the bird’s crop from the
altar since this part of its body, which is specifically the one into which food
enters, can be charged with theft and robbery (presumably, of food belonging to
29. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:61).
30. This unit does not cohere with the overarching theme of the poor person’s sacrifice, and was
apparently incorporated into this parashah because it presents yet another perspective on cereal offer-
ings. See Margaliot’s comments, Vayikra Rabbah, 1:63.
31. A bird offering is explicitly mentioned as a substitute for animal offerings, available for des-
titute persons, in Leviticus 5:7–10, 12:8, and 14:21–23. In Leviticus 5:11–13, the cereal offering is
mentioned as a substitute for those who cannot even afford a bird offering.
32. “With its feathers” seems to be the more literal translation of the Hebrew be-noz.atah (cf.
LXX: sun tois pterois). In contrast, Onkelos translates “he shall remove the crop with its contents”
(ya‘ade yat zafkei be-’okhlei).
33. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:64).
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others). The unit then continues, as we shall immediately see, to establish an
analogy between the bird’s crop and the human and/or animal nefesh, which is
likewise charged with theft and robbery. By choosing the word nefesh the homilist
creates resonance between the bird offering and the core verse of this parashah –
“if a person offers” (nefesh ki takriv), but also invokes the distinct corporeal
meaning of this word, as he casts the nefesh as equivalent to the bird’s crop
(i.e., as gullet):
(3.4b) Because this nefesh steals and robs, come and see how much pain [it
goes through] until it [=what it ate/stole] departs from it: from the mouth to
the esophagus, from the esophagus to the stomach, from the stomach to
mesisa, and from mesisa to bei kasya, and from bei kasya to the keres, and
from the keres to the intestines, and from the intestines to the small intestine,
and from the small intestine to the large intestine, and from the large intestine
to sane deyadva/divei [=lit. “the strainer of effluvia”], and from sane deyadva/
divei to the rectum, and from the rectum to the outside. Come and see how
much pain and how much toil until its food departs from it.34
Despite the dense and somewhat obscure anatomical terminology, the message
conveyed in this passage is rather simple: the protracted and complex process
of digestion, which is presented here as quite excruciating, serves as a form of pun-
ishment for the act of stealing and robbing entailed in eating, the location of which
is the gullet. It seems that the underlying assumption in this passage is that theft
and robbery are an essential characteristic of the nefesh, even if those do not actu-
ally take place in every act of eating (since obviously the “punitive” process of
digestion described here is not unique to the digestion of stolen foods). The
theme of eating as theft, as we will see, recurs in parashah 4 of Leviticus
Rabbah as well, as does the emphasis that the end of the digestion process is
the production of excrement.
The list of digestive organs itself is somewhat perplexing, since it is not
entirely clear whether it pertains to humans, to animals, or to both. The terms
mesisa and bei kasia can be quite safely understood as the third and second
chambers, respectively, in the stomach of ruminants35 (the omasum and the reticu-
lum).36 This led scholars to believe that the keres referred to here, which literally
simply means “belly” and is commonly used both in respect to humans and in
respect to animals, is the first chamber of the ruminant’s stomach (the rumen).37
34. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:64–65). Cf. Kohelet
Rabbah 7.19.
35. See, for example, M. H. ullin 3.1–2.
36. In Leviticus Rabbah, however, the term mesisa/meses is also used in accounts of human
anatomy; see Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 4, to Leviticus 4:2 (ed. Margaliot, 1:86); Vayikra
Rabbah, Mez.or‘a, par. 18, to Leviticus 15:2 (ed. Margaliot, 2:392).
37. Yehuda Leib Katzenelson, Ha-talmud ve-h.okhmat ha-refu’ah (Berlin: Hayim, 1928), 186–
89; Avraham Steinberg, Perakim be-patologiah shel ha-talmud ve-nos’ei kelav (Jerusalem: Schlesinger
Institution, 1975); accessed at http://www.medethics.org.il/articles/ASSIA/ASSIA6/R0061226.asp.
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It seems hardly likely, however, that the homilist intended to depict the protracted
digestive process as pertaining only to animals, since the word nefesh is most com-
monly identified with human beings, and as mentioned above, is often used
straightforwardly to denote “person.”38 The most plausible explanation for this
ambiguity is that the homilists indeed intended to refer to human beings in this
passage, but since the anatomic description that was readily available to them
was that of the ruminant’s digestive system, they used it without much regard
for the divergence of its details from human anatomy.39 There is also the possi-
bility that this equivocality is intentional, and that it serves the homilists to blur
the boundary between humans and animals—first, by creating an analogy
between the bird’s crop and the human nefesh, and then by remaining vague on
the distinction between humans and ruminants in what concerns the consumption
and digestion of food.
How does this unit, which develops the theme of the nefesh (here, in the
sense of gullet) as stealing and robbing, tie into the greater theme of the inherent
value of the sacrifice of the poor, which we identified in the parashah as a whole?
On the face of it, it does not. All that this unit does is invoke the biblical reference
to the bird offering. However, the following unit (3.5) suggests a much more con-
venient and smooth transition to the topic of bird offering, while nicely maintain-
ing the cohesiveness of the theme of the poor person’s sacrifice, in a way that
raises the question of what function, if any, unit 3.4 serves in the parashah.
Unit 3.5 commences with a comment on the manner in which a bird offering is
burnt on the altar, namely, as one piece, without removing its feathers and
without being dissected into its constituent parts:
(3.5a) “The Priest shall tear it open by its wings without severing it, and turn it
into smoke on the altar” [Leviticus 1:17]. R. Yoh.anan said: a layperson, if he
smells the smell of [=the bird’s] wings [being burnt], his soul (nafsho) is
repelled, and you say that it should be offered on the altar—what for?—So
that the altar will be adorned with the sacrifice of the poor.40
According to this passage, birds are sacrificed whole on the altar, even though this
brings about a particularly foul smell when the feathers are incinerated, so as to
make the offering seem more substantial and thus yield more dignity to the
poor person’s sacrifice. We immediately see that this passage elegantly ties the
parashah’s theme of the favorability of the poor person’s offering to the biblical
38. One could also argue that reading the description of the digestive process as relating to
animals is incommensurate with the statement that immediately precedes this passage, which excludes
domestic animals as creatures whose consumption of food does not involve theft and robbery. However,
it is not uncommon for adjacent midrashic passages to contradict one another without any comment on
the incongruity at hand.
39. Indeed, in Kohelet Rabbah 7.19 the same list of organs appears (albeit in a somewhat differ-
ent order) in a context that unmistakably refers to the human body.
40. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:65–66).
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verses dealing with the bird offering, and thus allows bird offerings and cereal
offerings to be discussed in tandem in what will follow.
Why, then, was the passage on the stealing and robbing gullet of birds/
humans/animals (3.4) included in the parashah, if it does not cohere with the
greater theme of the parashah and if a much more elegant transition to the
topic of the bird offering is suggested in 3.5? Here one could argue that unit 3.4
was included simply because it contains a homily on the biblical verses pertaining
to the bird offering, and is thus loosely connected to the following unit, which
deals with the same cluster of verses.41 In truth, Leviticus Rabbah has a strong
associative component to it, and it is not unusual for it to include midrashic
materials that do not serve the larger theme of a specific parashah. Nevertheless,
the fact that the theme of the robbing and stealing nefeshwill loom large in the next
parashah of the midrash, which also pertains to sacrifices, points to the possibility
that this unit was incorporated here intentionally, and that it is part of a thought-out
homiletic thread that runs across these two parashot. Specifically, in terms of its
function in Leviticus Rabbah 3, it seems that unit 3.4 puts forth the notion of
the animalistic nefesh (=the gullet), in order to contrast it with the nefesh
(=soul) that relinquishes its own food through the act of sacrifice, a notion that
the midrash continues to develop in the remaining parts of the parashah.
Immediately following the statement on the burning of the bird offering
whole so as to dignify the poor person who brought it, unit 3.5 continues to
relate three stories of poor persons and their offerings, all of which demonstrate
the idea that the meager sacrifice of the poor is most readily accepted by God,
even more so than the lavish animal sacrifices of persons of greater means. The
three stories can be briefly summarized as follows:
In the first story (3.5b), it is told of King Agrippa who, like King Solomon
in his time, wished to offer one thousand burnt offerings on the same day, and
asked that no one else be allowed to sacrifice that day. The priest, however,
made the call to allow a poor man who brought a pair of doves to make his sacri-
fice on that day. This takes place after the poor man tells the priest that every day
he catches four doves, two of which he uses for his own needs and two of which
he sacrifices. When King Agrippa learns of this event, he approves of the priest’s
decision.
The second story (3.5c) tells of an ox that was being taken to be sacrificed on
the altar, and along the way stood and refused to be led further; a poor man then
came and handed the ox a bundle of endives. Having eaten the endives, the ox was
able to cough out phlegm that was obstructing its throat, and then allowed itself to
be led to the altar.42 The owner of the ox then received a message in a dream that
the offering of the poor man (namely, the bundle of endives) was deemed prefer-
able to his own offering (i.e., the ox).
41. Cohen (“Leviticus Rabbah 3,” 29) dismissed this entire subunit as an example of “divergen-
cies and superfluities” in the otherwise neatly compiled parashah.
42. On the Greco-Roman cultic context of this story, see Saul Lieberman, Hellenism in Jewish
Palestine (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1962), 159.
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Finally, the third story (3.5d) tells of a woman who brought a handful of
semolina to the temple, and was scorned by the priest, who complained that
there is nothing in this offering—not for him to eat43 and not even for the token
amount that must be burnt on the altar. The priest then receives a message in a
dream that he must not scorn this woman, since she should be seen as one who
sacrificed her own soul.
All three stories, as is immediately discernible, powerfully make the point
that the measly sacrifice of the poor is accepted willingly and favorably by
God, more so than the plentiful offerings of the wealthy. This notion in itself is
not unique to Leviticus Rabbah, and can be found in various religious contexts.
One of the most well-known examples of this theme is the story of the poor
widow in Mark 12:41–44 (=Luke 21:1–4), in which Jesus praises a woman
who gave only two copper coins to the temple’s treasury, saying “this poor
widow has put in more than all those who are contributing to the treasury…
she, out of her poverty has put in everything she had, all she had to live on.”44
It is important to note, however, that in Leviticus Rabbah all three stories empha-
size that the merit of the poor person’s offering is entailed in the fact that it effec-
tively means giving up on one’s own nourishment. In the first case (3.5b), the poor
man sacrifices two of the doves he hunts daily, though he could have eaten them
rather than giving them to the temple. In the second story (3.5c), the bundle of
endives that the poor person hands the ox is not meant as an offering at all; it is
presumably meant for the man’s own sustenance, but the very fact that he relin-
quishes it in order to facilitate the sacrifice of the ox renders this bundle an offering
in and of itself. Finally, in the third story (3.5d) the point is explicitly made that for
the poor woman, even a scanty cereal offering is an extremely substantial sacrifice,
so much so that she should be considered as if she has sacrificed herself. The exact
wording of this story’s concluding line is highly instructive for our discussion
here: “… It was shown to the priest in the dream: do not scorn her, it is as if
she sacrificed her own nefesh.”45 The dual meaning of the word nefesh as both
gullet and soul/person serves here to convey the message that to sacrifice the
gullet—that is, to give up on one’s own food—is tantamount to sacrificing
oneself. The fact that the poor woman’s offering, as pitiful as it is, deprives her
of food, allows this offering to be seen as an offering of the highest order.
The message that the sacrifice of one’s potential food counts as a sacrifice of
oneself is bolstered in a comment that immediately follows the last story:
43. In Genizah Fragment New York, JTSA ENA 2699.23–24, and in MS Toronto (Friedberg,
Sasson 920), the priest’s concern regarding the portion he will get to eat does not appear. This could be a
result of scribal error, or of an intentional attempt to minimize the implicit criticism of the priest’s
behavior.
44. Mark 12:43–44 (NRSV translation).
45. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:67–68). Cf. B. Menah.ot
104b.
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(3.5e) And is this not a case that can be deduced a fortiori? If one who does not
offer a nefesh [=living being] is referred to by Scripture as nefesh [=person, in
the verse “when a person presents a (cereal) offering”], one who does bring a
nefesh [=living being], all the more so is it “as if she sacrificed her own
nefesh” [=soul/gullet].46
Here the homilists tie the notion that the poor person’s offering can be seen as self-
sacrifice to the verse around which the entire parashah revolves: “when a person
[nefesh] presents an offering.” They suggest a reading according to which the
offerer is also what is being offered: The nefesh (person) essentially sacrifices a
nefesh (gullet/soul). The homilists then continue to make the point that if the
offerer is actually, and not only metaphorically, offering a nefesh, that is, a
living being such as an animal, his or her offering is seen as even more worth-
while.47 Indeed, this comment seems to run against everything the parashah
has been attempting to establish until now, namely, that animal sacrifices are
not necessarily superior to the meager offerings of poor persons;48 but the main
message here is that the more substantial the source of nourishment which a
person gives up on in order to sacrifice, the more worthwhile and desirable the
offering.
Through the multiple meanings of the word nefesh the redactors of this
parashah construct a contrast between the nefesh that consumes food, and the
nefesh that is willing to relinquish food in order to dedicate it to God. What
makes the act of sacrifice worthy, in this view, is the willingness to deprive the
gullet; in turn, the gullet itself is portrayed highly negatively, as engaging in
theft and robbery, and as animalistic in nature. Thus the authors of Leviticus
Rabbah 3 achieve two things: first, they distance and separate the act of sacrifi-
cing from the act of eating (acts which were closely intertwined in the ancient
world), and second, they establish the inferiority of the eater in relation to the
sacrificer.
Interestingly, the midrash establishes the superiority of the sacrificer to the
eater not only by contrasting the gullet with the self-sacrificing soul, but also by
contrasting the one who brings the offering with the one who ultimately gets to
consume it—namely, the priest. Thus we find in the concluding unit of this
parashah:
46. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:68). This entire passage
is missing in MSS London (British Library Add. 27,169) and Munich (Bayerische Staatsbibliothek heb.
117).
47. Margaliot (Vayikra Rabbah, 68) and Cohen (“Leviticus Rabbah 3,” 27) interpret the phrase
“one who does bring a nefesh” as pertaining to fast and repentance. However, this reading seems to be a
forced attempt to make the passage cohere with the rest of the unit.
48. Such incongruities within a single parashah are not uncommon, as shown by Heinemann,
“‘Omanut ha-kompoziz. iah,” 814. Heinemann sees such inherent contradictions as reflecting a “dialec-
tical approach” on the side of the editor. See also Cohen, “Leviticus Rabbah 3.”
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(3.6)… Behold one who brought his cereal-offering from Gaul [Galia] or
from Spain [’Aspamia] and from their neighboring [areas], and he saw the
priest removing the handful [which is designated to be burnt on the altar]
and eating all the rest, and he said: Woe is me, all that pain I have gone
through so that that one will eat! And they [=presumably other people at
the temple] would appease him and say: if that one, who has only gone
through the pain of two footsteps between the hall and the altar was rewarded
with eating, you who have gone through all this pain, all the more so [that you
will be rewarded].49
This unit, which emphasizes the role of the priest as the one who actually gets to
consume the offerings, echoes the portrayal of the priest in 3.5d as lamenting the
small quantity of the woman’s cereal offering, which does not leave much for him
to eat. While the midrash never questions the priests’ prerogative to consume the
offerings—in fact the concluding unit (3.6) later attempts to affirm this very pre-
rogative—it does use the figure of the eager-to-eat priest, who is portrayed as
rather crude and selfish,50 to highlight the notion that the one sacrificing is not
the one eating. Through this contrast between the sacrificer and the eater, the
homilists construct the act of sacrificing and the act of eating as fundamentally
opposed, and stress the noble nature of the states of mind and body associated
with the former as opposed to the lowly nature of those associated with the latter.
LEVITICUS RABBAH 4: “AND THE NEFESH IS NOT SATISFIED”
The Levitical verse around which parashah 4 of Leviticus Rabbah revolves
is Leviticus 4:2, “when a person [nefesh] unwittingly incurs guilt,” which com-
mences the biblical discussion of the rules pertaining to purification offering
(h.attat). The midrashic parashah not only refrains from any discussion of the puri-
fication offering as such, it barely even engages with more general subjects that
could potentially arise from the biblical materials, such as the theme of uninten-
tional sin. Rather, it focuses almost exclusively on the word nefesh in and of
itself, and assembles various traditions that pertain to the nature, function, and
virtue (or lack thereof) of the human nefesh.51 Indeed, the dual meaning of
49. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 3, to Leviticus 2:1 (ed. Margaliot, 1:68).
50. The theme of the gluttonous priest appears elsewhere in rabbinic literature (most notably, B.
Pesah. im 57a), and the unflattering depiction of the priests here echoes a certain animosity between
priests and rabbis, which is discernible in various traditions from and about the Second Temple
period. On the competition and enmity between priests and rabbis, see Stuart A. Cohen, The Three
Crowns: Structures of Communal Politics in Early Rabbinic Jewry (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990), 147–78; for a more refined argument, see Martha Himmelfarb, A Kingdom of Priests:
Ancestry and Merit in Ancient Judaism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 165–
70. However, the motif of the voracious priest is also familiar from Greek and Roman literature; see
for example, Apuleius’s Metamorphoses, book 8, esp. 8:29.
51. On Leviticus Rabbah 4, see Burton L. Visotzky, “The Priest’s Daughter and the Thief in the
Orchard: The Soul of Midrash Leviticus Rabbah,” in Putting Body and Soul Together: Essays in Honor
of Robin Scroggs, eds. Virginia Wiles, Alexandra Brown, and Graydon Snyder (Valley Forge, PA:
Trinity Press, 1997), 165–71; Stern, “Vayikra Rabbah.”
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nefesh as both soul and gullet informs much of Leviticus Rabbah 4 and strongly
connects it with Leviticus Rabbah 3, in a manner that allows the two parashot to
function together to promote a particular view of sacrifices.
The first three units in the parashah are petih. tot, starting at a distant verse
and making their way gradually to the local Torah verse, in this case, “when a
person [nefesh] unwittingly incurs guilt” (Leviticus 4:2). Notably, two of the
three petih. tot work to construct a tension between the two meanings of nefesh:
between the divine source of justice and morals and the base location of voracious,
animal-like eating.
The distant verse in the first petih. ta of the three (4.1) is Ecclesiastes 3:16,
“At the place of justice there is wickedness.” This verse is followed by multiple
examples of biblical episodes in which in a place that used to be of justice, iniqui-
ties and treacheries took place. The final example of wickedness located in the
place of justice is unique: it suggests that both justice and soul (nefesh) are
located in the same place, and that this place is God’s hand. This tradition, attrib-
uted to R. Levi, relies on the verses “In His hand is every living soul and the breath
of all mankind” (Job 12:10) and “My hand lays hold on Judgment” (Deuteronomy
32:41). The anonymous homilist then adds that the soul is “located in the place
of judgment, but sins.” This comment is followed by a tradition attributed to
R. Yiz.h. ak:
(4.1) R. Yiz.h. ak said: The Holy One, blessed be He, said to the nefesh: I have
written in regard to you, “But make sure that you do not partake in the blood,
for the blood is the life [ha-dam hu ha-nefesh], and you must not consume life
with the flesh” [Deuteronomy 12:23], and you go out and sin and steal and
rob?52—[hence] “When a person [nefesh] unwittingly incurs guilt.”53
The concluding passage of petih. ta 4.1 is addressing an apparent conundrum in the
biblical verse at hand: how can the nefesh, which is presumably of divine origin,
“incur guilt” by committing a sin? The midrash deploys this conundrum as an
example of a case in which a place of judgment turns into a place of wickedness,
pointing to God’s disappointment in the soul’s choice to stoop to sin. However, the
way in which the sinful proclivity of the soul is portrayed in this passage suggests
that this sin is closely associated with voracious eating, and that the sinful nefesh
is, in essence, the gullet. In order to grasp this in full, let us take note of the biblical
edict to which R. Yiz.h. ak is alluding in its broader context:
52. The words “and steals and robs” (ve-gozelet ve-h.omeset) are missing in the printed edition,
and in MSS St. Petersburg (Firkovich I 241), Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale héb. 149), and Oxford
(Bodleian Opp. Add. fol. 51). The omission of these words might stem from a misunderstanding of
the connection between eating of blood and theft and robbery, which Margaliot (Vayikra Rabbah,
80) also found perplexing. In Genizah Fragment Cambridge T-S K27.23, the entire reference to the
eating of blood is missing.
53. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 4, to Leviticus 4:2 (ed. Margaliot, 1:80).
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When the Lord enlarges your territory as He has promised you, and you say “I
shall eat meat” for your soul/gullet desires [ki te’ave nafshekha] to eat meat,
you may eat meat whenever your soul/gullet desires [be-khol ’avat nafsheka]
… But make sure that you do not partake in the blood, for the blood is the life/
soul [ha-dam hu ha-nefesh], and you must not consume life/soul with the
flesh.54
R. Yiz.h. ak invokes the verse from Deuteronomy in order to emphasize the pre-
ferred and elevated nature of the nefesh in God’s view, which is manifested in
the prohibition to consume the blood “for the blood is the nefesh.”55 The prohibi-
tion at hand is directed towards a practice of eating, and is intended to mitigate the
general permission to consume nonsacrificial meat on account of one’s craving for
it, which is itself described by the idiom “if your nefesh desires.” The verse thus
refers both to the nefesh that craves food, which is in effect the gullet, and to the
nefesh in the sense of life or soul, which is protected by God on account of its pre-
ciousness. Much to God’s dismay, the nefesh ends up “stealing and robbing,” thus
abandoning its higher calling. As we may recall, the very same conjunction of
verbs, “steal” and “rob” (gzl and h.ms) was used to describe the nefesh, in
analogy to the bird’s crop, in the previous parashah. Furthermore, this homily
creates a strong association between “stealing and robbing” and uninhibited
eating, which includes the consumption of blood. I propose, then, that the oscil-
lation of the nefesh between its divine origin and its sinful actions is implicitly
mapped out in this passage as an oscillation between soul and gullet. It seems
hardly incidental that this oscillation is charted onto a biblical text that discusses
the transition from ritual sacrifice to slaughter for self-consumption.
The second petih. ta (4.2) pertains strictly to the theme of nefesh, as the distant
verse with which it commences is “All of man’s toil is for the sake of his mouth, yet
his nefesh is not satisfied” (Ecclesiastes 6:7). While this verse seems to refer to
eating and to nefesh in the sense of gullet in the most straightforward way, most
of the midrashic readings in the petih. ta on this verse present highly “spiritual”
interpretations, unequivocally taking nefesh to refer to the divinely motivated
soul, and taking the “toil” mentioned in the verse to refer to good deeds and per-
formance of commandments, which are the means by which one’s soul can be sat-
isfied.56 Among these one particular reading stands out, which is attributed to the
anonymous rabbis (rabbanin): they present a highly physical reading of the verse,
contending that all that one toils to earn in order to eat ends up producing only “foul
smell.”57 This seems like a subtle reference to excrement, taking the insatiability of
54. Deuteronomy 12:20, 24.
55. On the biblical notion that “the blood is the life” see William K. Gilders, Blood Ritual in the
Hebrew Bible: Meaning and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 12–32.
56. Cf. Kohelet Rabbah 6.6–7.
57. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 4, to Leviticus 4:2 (ed. Margaliot, 1:82). In the printed
edition, as well as in MSS St. Petersburg (Firkovich I 241) and Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale héb.
149), the version is “and not to foul smell.” See Margaliot’s comments in Vayikra Rabbah, 1:83. In
Kohelet Rabbah 6.6–7 the entire reference to “foul smell” is missing.
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the nefesh to mean that whatever one puts into one’s body ends up getting out of
one’s body. As we have seen, the notion that whatever goes into the mouth (or
gullet) ends up being excreted also appears in Leviticus Rabbah 3, in the unit
that elaborates on the lengthy process of digestion with which the “stealing and
robbing” nefesh is penalized. In addition, the very same characterization of the
nefesh as stealing and robbing recurs again in the end of petih. ta 4.2:
(4.2) R. Yehoshu‘a of Sikhnin [said] in the name of R. Levi: the word nefesh is
written here [=in chapters 4 and 5 of Leviticus, which pertain to sin58] six
times, in correspondence with the six days of creation. The Holy One,
blessed be He, said to the nefesh: all that I have created in the six days of
creation I have created only for you, and you go out and sin and steal and
rob?59—[hence] “When a person [nefesh] unwittingly incurs guilt.”60
The concluding unit of petih. ta 4.2, like the concluding unit of petih. ta 4.1 and
through the use of almost identical structure and vocabulary, comments on the
apparent incongruity between soul and sin – here pointing to the fact that sin
and soul appear in conjunction in the Levitical text not once, but six times. The
number six invokes the six days of creation, in the course of which God created
things that were all ultimately meant for the sustenance and joy of human
beings, a notion through which the homilist relates God’s disappointment in the
human nefesh: the nefesh is so insatiable, that despite the fact that everything in
the world exists to satisfy it, it goes forth and “steals and robs” that which does
not belong to it. There is thus a clear opposition between the nefesh that is
God’s most treasured pinnacle of creation, and the insatiable nefesh which
steals and robs, an opposition that again translates to the opposition between
soul and gullet. Going back and forth between the spiritual and physical meanings
of nefesh, the homilists construct a notion of a person as oscillating between the
urge for fulfillment of commandments and the urge to satisfy one’s appetite,
and closely identify the latter urge with sin, namely, with stealing and robbing.
The third petih. ta in the parashah (4.3) is less relevant for our discussion
here, particularly since it does not address the topic of nefesh as such but rather
presents homilies on the nature and meanings of sins incurred unwittingly.
However, the unit that immediately follows (4.4) returns to the general motif of
the incongruity between nefesh and sin, and again uses the literary pattern that
we have seen in petih. tot 4.1 and 4.2:
58. The word nefesh actually appears in Leviticus 4–5 eight times (Leviticus 4:2, 4:27, 5:1, 5:2,
5:4, 5:15, 5:17, 5:20). According to Margaliot (Vayikra Rabbah, 1:84), verses 5:2 and 5:4 are not meant
to be included in the list, since they do not address the issue of sin.
59. The words “and steals and robs” (ve-gozelet ve-h.omeset) are missing in the printed edition,
as well as in MSS St. Petersburg (Firkovich I 241), Paris (Bibliothèque Nationale héb. 149), and Oxford
(Bodleian Opp. Add. fol. 51).
60. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 4, to Leviticus 4:2 (ed. Margaliot, 1:84).
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(4.4) Ten things minister to the nefesh: the esophagus for food, the windpipe
for the voice, the liver for anger, the gall for jealousy, the lung for hydration,61
the mesisa to grind, the spleen to laugh, the stomach for sleep, the kidneys
advise, the heart fathoms, the tongue concludes, and the nefesh is above
them all.62 The Holy One, blessed be He, said to it: I made you above all
things and you go out and sin and steal and rob?—[hence] “When a person
[nefesh] unwittingly incurs guilt.”63
Within its midrashic context, this anatomical list conveys the message that the
entire complex and multifaceted mechanism of the human body, with all its con-
stituent parts, has only one purpose—to serve the nefesh. Nevertheless, the homi-
list complains, the nefesh still engages in theft and robbery, not living up to its
superior position and divine favorability.
In truth, this passage does not deal with the topic of food at all, except by
mentioning some of the functions of digestion in the body. However, the identical
literary pattern which recurs in units 4.1, 4.2, and 4.4, and the strong resonance of
this pattern with unit 3.4, does allow us to see unit 4.4 as part of a homiletic thread
woven across these two parashot. This thread contrasts what the nefesh could be
(godly and leading one towards good deeds and fulfillment of commandments)
with what it in fact chooses to be (animalistic and voracious), and maps out this
contrast through the two meanings of nefesh, soul and gullet respectively, by
associating the latter with eating in three out of four passages.
The remaining units of Leviticus Rabbah 4, for the most part, do not tie into
this homiletic thread, but rather present various independent traditions that
develop the notion of nefesh in various directions; in all those units nefesh is
unequivocally used to refer to soul. Unit 4.5 reflects on the relation between
soul and body, debating which one of them has greater responsibility when
judged before God; unit 4.6 expounds on the use of the singular form nefesh
even when referring to the people of Israel as a group; unit 4.7 comments on
the five appearances of the invocation “my soul, bless God” in the book of
Psalms; and unit 4.8 suggests an elaborate comparison of the soul to God, main-
taining that the correspondence between them makes it appropriate for the soul to
engage in the praise of God.
It is in this last unit that we find a passing comment that helps illuminate the
homiletic thread highlighted above. This unit presents a series of analogies
between the soul’s function in the body and God’s function in the world: the
soul fills the body as God fills the world, the soul outlasts the body as God outlasts
61. The manuscripts vary regarding the exact wording here, and some of the versions are clearly
errors; however, the root sh-t-i (to drink) does appear in all the versions, making it plausible to explain
the lung’s function in terms of hydration (cf. B. Berakhot 61b: “the lung absorbs all kinds of liquids”).
See Fred Rosner Encyclopedia of Medicine in the Bible and in the Talmud (Northvale, NJ: Jason
Aronson, 2000), 195.
62. Almost identical lists appear in B. Berakhot 61a–b and in Kohelet Rabbah 7.19 (without
mentioning the nefesh at the end).
63. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 4, to Leviticus 4:2 (ed. Margaliot, 1:86–87).
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the world, the soul sees without being seen as God sees without being seen, etc.
Among these analogies, we find the comment that “the soul does not eat in the
body and the Holy One, blessed be He, has no eating before Him.”64 According
to this comment, one of the distinct manifestations of the soul’s godlike nature
is the fact that it does not eat. While there is no reason to see intentional correspon-
dence between unit 4.8 and the units that were discussed above, this unit does
provide us with an important indication that when the word nefesh was taken in
the most spiritual direction possible, it entailed the notion of refraining from
eating. Eating, then, was for the rabbis a critical component in defining the
range of possibilities of the word nefesh: from its most animalistic sense, which
corresponds with gullet or even a bird’s crop, to its most spiritual and godlike
sense, to which eating is entirely foreign.
As the midrashic units that were discussed above make clear, the two mean-
ings of nefesh are not mutually exclusive: the nefesh that robs and steals is not an
entirely different entity from the nefesh that is God’s treasured possession. Rather,
a transition between the two is possible, and the nefesh can be transformed from
godlike to animal-like, if it chooses to take part in sinful activities; presumably, a
transition in the other direction is possible as well, if one chooses to engage in
good deeds and follow the commandments. The question then arises: if the nefesh
in its lowly and sinful form is identified with the gullet and associated with the
act of eating, and the nefesh in its most lofty and divine form is associated with
non-eating, what role does food play in the transition between one and the other?
Should we take the midrash to be suggesting an ascetic regime of abstinence from
food as a path for self-purification, for a transformation from animal to godlike?
In order to consider this question, and ultimately to return to the greater
theme of sacrifices and their reframing in Leviticus Rabbah, I turn now to
examine Greek, Roman, and early Christian materials that help shed light on
some of the attitudes towards food that we have seen in the midrash. Many of
the themes we have identified in Leviticus Rabbah seem to be rooted in the rheto-
ric and imagery of moralistic diatribes against gluttony or in support of asceticism,
which were quite prevalent in antiquity and late antiquity. However, I will argue
that in Leviticus Rabbah these common themes are not employed only to
promote moderation and/or asceticism, but also, and perhaps especially, to
reframe the concept of sacrifice.
HOMICIDA GULA: GRECO-ROMAN AND EARLY CHRISTIAN DIATRIBES AGAINST
GLUTTONY
Apprehension regarding food and eating was a deep-rooted part of the intel-
lectual world of Mediterranean antiquity. Philosophers, poets, physicians, and reli-
gious preachers were highly concerned with gluttony and unbridled passion for
food, which they identified as both morally corrupt and physiologically unhealthy,
and dedicated great rhetorical efforts to warn against the medical, ethical, reli-
gious, political, and even environmental repercussions of this vice.65 Several of
64. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 4, to Leviticus 4:2 (ed. Margaliot, 1:97).
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the motifs that recur in the parashot of Leviticus Rabbah examined above strongly
resonate with themes found in such criticisms of gluttony, and reflect a shared cul-
tural universe in which the authors of Leviticus Rabbah partook. To be clear, I am
not arguing for a direct line of influence between any of the works mentioned
below and rabbinic authors. Rather, I am pointing to a pervasive moralistic and
religious theme that percolated throughout the world of late antiquity, which the
rabbis were likely to absorb,66 to some extent or another, by being an inseparable
part of this world.67
The contrast and tension between gullet and soul, which I have traced in
Leviticus Rabbah, closely corresponds with the well-established classical notion
that eating and preoccupation with food stand in opposition to spiritual advance-
ment, and hinder one’s ability to partake in the more divine aspects of life. In the
Timaeus, Plato makes the point that being obsessed with food means being
“devoid of philosophy and culture [aphilosophon kai amouson], and disobedient
to the most divine part (tou theiotatoutōn) we possess.”68 Following the same line
of thought, the early Christian Desert Fathers, while advocating not only moder-
ation in the consumption of food but also fierce asceticism, repeatedly identified
food as an obstruction to spiritual and intellectual attainment.69 Thus Evagrius of
65. For surveys of various classical and early Christian diatribes against gluttony, see Veronika
E. Grimm, From Feasting to Fasting: The Evolution of a Sin (London: Routledge, 1996); Karl Olav
Sandnes, Belly and Body in the Pauline Epistles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
24–135.
66. While it is difficult to find elaborate diatribes against gluttony in rabbinic literature, various
rabbinic narratives and aphorisms present both overt and implicit condemnations of gluttony as unac-
ceptable social behavior, associated with rudeness, obtrusiveness, and impiety. For various examples,
see Ruhama Weiss, ’Okhlim la-da‘at: tafkidan ha-tarbuti shel ha-se‘udot be-sifrut h. azal (Tel Aviv:
Ha-kibbutz Ha-me’uh.ad, 2010), 120–47.
67. The scholarly literature that explores rabbinic culture as deeply situated in the Greco-Roman
and early Christian world, pioneered by Saul Lieberman’s Hellenism in Jewish Palestine (New York:
JTS Press, 1962), is copious. For but a few notable examples, see Lee I. Levine, Judaism and Hellenism
in Antiquity: Conflict or Confluence (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998); Peter Schaefer
and Catherine Hezser, eds., The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman Culture, 3 vols. (Tübingen:
Mohr Siebeck, 1998–2002); Richard Kalmin and Seth Schwartz, eds., Jewish Culture and Society
under the Christian Roman Empire (Peeters: Leuven, 2006); Hayim Lapin, Rabbis as Romans: The
Rabbinic Movement in Palestine, 100–400 C.E. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
68. Timaeus 73a, quoted from W. R. M. Lamb’s translation, Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 9
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1925). Similarly, Musonius Rufus points that gluttonous
people are turned into animals since they lose their rational faculty (fragment 18b), Musonius Rufus:
Lectures and Sayings, ed. William B. Irvine and trans. Cynthia King (CreateSpace, 2011), 74; see
also Anton C. van Geytenbeek, Musonius Rufus and Greek Diatribe (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1962),
96–111.
69. This theme is highly prominent in the compilation known as Apophthegmata Patrum (“The
Sayings of the Fathers,” henceforth AP) which contains traditions and statements of and about the early
monastic communities in Egypt, Syria, and Palestine from approximately the fifth century CE. On the
history and formation of this compilation see Douglas Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert: Scrip-
ture and the Quest for Holiness in Early Christian Monasticism (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), 76–104. On the monastic literature’s resonance with and impact on rabbinic literature, see Cathe-
rine Hezser, “Apophthegmata Patrum and Apophthegmata of the Rabbis,” La Narrativa Cristiana
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Pontus declared that abstinence from food “cultivates the rational land” and “puri-
fies the intellect,”70 and Abba Poemen is quoted as saying that one cannot acquire
fear of God when one’s belly is full.71 The refinement of the soul, then, is seen as
contingent upon the ability to dissociate oneself from the part of the person that
constantly craves food,72 which Plato straightforwardly defines as beastly (ther-
iōdes) in nature.73
Especially pertinent to Leviticus Rabbah’s play on the dual meaning of
nefesh is the discussion on the liberation of the soul from the body in Plato’s
Phaedo, in which Socrates presents the view that souls that are worthy are entirely
released from a bodily existence upon death and are then free to attain their full
divine potential. However, the unfortunate souls of those who engaged in gluttony
(gastrimargia), violence (hubreis), and drunkenness (philoposia) are doomed to
remain trapped within bodies—and moreover, to migrate into the bodies of
animals.74 This passage clearly suggests that the soul oscillates between the
beastly and the divine, with the beastly nature closely associated with an insatiable
lust for food and drink. A failure of the soul to overcome its beastly propensities
fully turns it, quite literally, into an animal. It may be suggested, then, that Levi-
ticus Rabbah’s motif of the soul stumbling between its divine origin and its pro-
clivity to devour, rob, and tend to bodily desires is in line with this influential
Platonic idea.
There is, however, a notable distance between considering eating and preoc-
cupation with food to be lowly aspects of human living, and identifying them with
sin and moral depravity, as the homilists in Leviticus Rabbah do. As we have seen
above, parashot 3 and 4 in Leviticus Rabbah recurrently refer to the sinfulness of
the nefesh as “stealing and robbing,” and in three out of the four units in which this
theme appears, the context suggests a close association between stealing and
robbing and voracious eating. Where did this association of eating with theft
and robbery come from?
Here too there is interesting correspondence between prevalent motifs in
Greek, Roman, and early Christian literature and the themes we identified in Levi-
ticus Rabbah. In various tirades and cautionary diatribes against gluttony we find
the notion that when one devours excessive amounts of food, one essentially
Antica (Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 1995), 453–64; Michal Bar-Asher Siegal, Early
Christian Monastic Literature and the Babylonian Talmud (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2013).
70. Evagrius of Pontus, Talking Back: A Monastic Handbook for Combating Demons, trans.
David Brakke (Trappist, KY: Cistercian Publications, 2009), 53.
71. AP Poemen 181 (Patrologia Graeca 65:365). Cf. B. Berakhot 10b: “Whoever eats and
drinks and only then prays, to him refers the verse ‘you have cast me behind your back’ (2 Kings 14:9).”
72. See, for example, AP Silvanus 5 (Patrologia Graeca 65:409), in which a truly spiritual man
is recognized as one who has no need for food.
73. Republic IX 571c. Plato, Republic, Books 6–10, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William
Preddy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).
74. Phaedo 81e. Plato, Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, trans. Harold North
Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914).
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deprives others and robs them of their own portion.75 Thus, for instance, the Stoic
Musonius Rufus maintains that one who is overly eager to consume copious
amounts of food is bound to be unjust toward others,76 and Philo of Alexandria
describes the glutton as one who is not hesitant to seize the food of his neighbor
in addition to his own.77 This theme closely resonates with the famous rabbinic
depiction of “the rebellious son” mentioned in Deuteronomy 21:18–21 as one
who, in his all-consuming lust for food and drink, is likely to end up “going out
and robbing human beings.”78 A similar association between eating and stealing
can be found in a monastic tradition, in which the desire for food is described
as almost inevitably leading to stealing, and one is advised to refrain from both:
“do not steal and do not eat” (mē klepte kai trōge).79
More broadly, Greek, Roman, and Christian writers often portrayed gluttony
as a particular manifestation of greed, in such a way that the lust for food and the
lust for money were constructed as inextricably linked, and were both associated
with willingness to exploit and abuse others.80 As Emily Gowers showed in detail,
the idea that gluttony and covetousness of food leads to moral depravation and
entails the brutal exploitation of others is especially prominent in the satires of
Juvenal and Petronius,81 who used vivid descriptions of Roman banquets and
feasts to accentuate disapprovingly the differences between the rich and the
poor. Gowers emphasizes the role of animalistic imagery in Roman satirical depic-
tions of gluttony, which blurs the distinction between the eater and what is eaten
and makes the point that in giving oneself over to the lust for food one, in essence,
becomes a beast.82 This intricate connection between greed and gluttony, between
devouring others’ property and devouring food, allows us to situate the midrashic
homilies that associate eating with “stealing and robbing” in the cultural context in
75. Cf. 1 Corinthians 11:17–34. Sandnes summarizes this motif as follows: “It is the nature of
such persons [=gluttonous] to demand ever more… these demands cannot be satisfied by just methods”
(Belly and Body, 49). See also Grimm, From Feasting to Fasting, 55.
76. Fragment 20; see Irvine and King, Musonius Rufus, 80.
77. On Flight and Finding, 31. Philo, The Works of Philo, trans. Charles Yonge (Peabody, MA:
Hendrickson, 2006).
78. Sifre Devarim, Re’eh, pis. 220, to Deuteronomy 21:18 (ed. Finkelstein, p. 253); B. Sanhe-
drin 71a.
79. AP Zeno 6 (Patrologia Graeca 65:178).
80. This idea appears already in Plato’s Timaeus 73a. According to Evagrius of Pontus (De
diversis malignis cognitationibus, 1= Patrologia Graeca 79:1200-1201), the demons that incite glut-
tony are also the ones that incite greed; on gluttony as “the mother of all vices” in the works of Evagrius
and his disciples, see Teresa M. Shaw, The Burden of the Flesh: Fasting and Sexuality in Early Chris-
tianity (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 131–60. For a similar view on the connection between gluttony
and greed, see John Chrysostom, Epistolam ad Ephesios, Homily 13.3–4 (Patrologia Graeca
62:93-97). Sandnes (Belly and Body, 224–47) demonstrates that many early Christian interpreters
read Paul’s reference to people who “have their belly as a god” (Philippians 3:14) as associating the
worship of the belly with the love of money, since gluttony and greed were seen as inextricably linked.
81. Emily Gowers, The Loaded Table: Representations of Food in Roman Literature (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1993), 188–219.
82. Gowers, Loaded Table, 30, 121.
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which they were produced, and to see the disdain for eating that they express as
part of mindsets shaped in the Mediterranean world of antiquity and late antiquity.
This cultural context might also lend support to the reading of nefesh as
gullet in the homilies of Leviticus Rabbah. In Greco-Roman culture, the gullet
or throat was often seen as the seat of craving for food, as is best demonstrated
by the fact that the Latin word for gluttony is simply the word for gullet (gula),
whereas the common Greek words for gluttony are either laimargia (“gullet
madness”) or gastrimargia (“stomach madness”). Indeed, Horace refers to the
unceasing quest for food as a behavior that makes one “servile to his gullet”
(servile gulae).83 The notion that the gullet is the place in the body in which the
lust for food is located,84 and thus the place that can be charged with the atrocities
pertaining to this lust, is also traceable in early Christian literature. Thus, for
example, Abba Poemen states that just as David grabbed the lion by the throat
to kill it (1 Samuel 17:35), so must we “take ourselves by our gullet [laryngiou]
and by our belly [kolias]” in order to kill the lion that is within us.85 Most
notably, Tertullian, in his De ieiunio adversus psychicos, identifies “the murderous
gullet” (homicidam gulam) as the birthplace of all sin, as this is where the original
sin of eating from the forbidden fruit commenced.86
As demonstrated above in Abba Poemen’s statement, in many of the dia-
tribes against gluttony or in advocacy of asceticism, the gullet and the belly are
invoked either interchangeably or in the form of hendiadys to portray the reprehen-
sible obsession with food. For example, in describing the preparations for a par-
ticularly lavish feast, Seneca makes the point that the enormous amounts of
food prepared were designated “for a single gullet [unam gulam], for a single
belly [unus venter].”87 Similarly, Augustine reproachfully describes the banquets
at the tombs of the dead martyrs with the words “throats and bellies prepare them-
selves” ( fauces ventresque se parare).88 Juvenal, in one of his invectives against
the madness of overconsumption in Rome, describes how the gullet is over-
swelling (crescente gula) to allow the belly to contain all the mounds of silver,
flocks, and estates that have been invested in the meal.89 The latter text is particu-
larly resonant with a midrashic tradition that we find in parashah 18 of Leviticus
Rabbah, an elaborate homily on the concluding chapter of the book of Eccle-
siastes, which describes the destruction of the body through old age and death.
83. Satire 2.7, 111. Horace, Satires, Epistles, and Ars Poetica, trans. Henry Rushton Fairclaugh
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). Equally prominent, however, is the notion that glut-
tony is tantamount to “serving one’s belly” as Sandnes (Belly and Body, 35–60, 97–107, 165–80) shows
in detail.
84. See, for instance, Musonius Rufus, Fragment 18b (Irvine and King, Musonius Rufus, 75).
85. AP Poemen 178 (Patrologia Graeca, 65:365).
86. Tertullian, De Ieiunio, 3.
87. Epistle 95.19. Lucius Annaeius Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistolae Morales, trans. L.D. Rey-
nolds (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965).
88. Epistle 29.8. John E. Rotelle (ed.), The Works of Saint Augustine: Letters 1-99, trans. Roland
Teske (New York, New City Press, 2001).
89. Satire 11.38–4. Juvenal and Perseus, trans. Jeffrey Henderson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004). See Gowers, Loaded Table, 201.
The Animalistic Gullet and the Godlike Soul
243
The homilists expound on the obscure verse “the golden bowl crashes and the jar is
shattered at the spring” (Ecclesiastes 12:6):
And the golden bowl crashes [ve-taroz. gulat ha-zahav]… R. H. iyya b. Neh. e-
miah said: this is the gullet [gargeret], which does away with the gold and
makes silver disappear.90
It seems that R. H. iyya b. Neh. emiah’s explanation builds on the similarity between
the Hebrew gulat ha-zahav and the Latin gula, and suggests that the gullet is
associated with gold since one uses all of one’s possessions in order to please
it. The homilists then continue to expound on the following sentence in the verse:
And the jar is shattered at the spring—this is the belly [keres]. R. Abba the son
of R. Papi and R. Yehoshu‘a of Sikhnin in the name of R. Levi [said]: Three
days after [one’s death] the belly shatters and its stench extends to the mouth,
and it tells it [the mouth]: there for you is all that you have stolen and robbed
[gazalta ve-h.amasta] and placed inside me.
91
This passage powerfully describes the codependence between the gullet (here
described simply as “mouth,” peh), whose consumption of food is described yet
again in terms of theft and robbery, and the belly, which functions as a repository
for all those robbed food items. This midrashic unit, then, helps us see the extent to
which the characterization of the gullet as stealing and robbing is rooted in Greek
and Roman rhetoric and imagery used in criticisms of gluttony and preoccupation
with food.
Furthermore, the unit quoted from parashah 18 uses another motif that we
have seen in our discussion of parashot 3 and 4, namely, the motif of the turning of
all food into excrement. This idea appeared both in 3.4, in the description of the
elaborate path of food from the gullet to the outside, and in 4.2, in the statement
that all that food eventually produces is “foul smell.”92 The above homily on
Ecclesiastes 12:7 presents a particularly gruesome take on this motif, describing
how upon death the path from the mouth to the belly is reversed, as the belly
breaks open and all the food it contains, now in the form of excrement, oozes
back into the mouth. As with the themes that were discussed above, the theme
of the turning of all food into excrement is also notably traceable in Greco-Roman
tirades against gluttony.93
90. Vayikra Rabbah, Mez.or‘a, par. 18, to Leviticus 15:2 (ed. Margaliot, 2:397).
91. Vayikra Rabbah, Mez.or‘a, par. 18, to Leviticus 15:2 (ed. Margaliot, 2:398). Cf. Kohelet
Rabbah 12.6. See also, in slightly different versions, Y. Yevamot 16:3, 15c; Y. Mo‘ed Katan 3:5,
82b; B. Shabbat 151b.
92. Cf. Mark 7:18 (=Matthew 15:17): “whatever enters the body goes into the stomach and then
out of the body.”
93. Resonating with the homily in Leviticus Rabbah 3.4 on the pains through which one goes
until the digestion process is complete, Seneca (Moral Epistles 47.2) mentions that the more one eats,
the more protracted and agonizing the process of the disposal of waste. For examples of uses of the
motif of excrement in patristic tirades against gluttony, see Tertullian,De Ieiunio 6.1; John Chrysostom,
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However, while the homilies we have seen in Leviticus Rabbah clearly share
themes, motifs, rhetorical structures, and general mindsets with Greek, Roman,
and early Christian literature, the question remains: what agenda did these homi-
lies attempt to promote in their midrashic setting? The homilists do not seem to be
endorsing an ideal of moderation and temperance, as many of the Greek and
Roman diatribes against gluttony do,94 nor do they explicitly propagate an
ascetic regime or at least occasional fasting, as the early Christians texts that
use the same motifs do.95 The latter point is perhaps particularly surprising con-
sidering the fact that the practice of fasting and self-denial of food was apparently
quite prevalent among Jewish circles in Palestine of the talmudic period.96 What
purpose, then, does the criticism of food and eating serve in parashot 3 and 4 of
Leviticus Rabbah? What message do the homilists hope to convey by describing
the gullet as a sinful part of the body, and by referring to the consequences of
eating in such sordid terms? The key to answering these questions, I propose,
lies in the midrashic presentation of sacrificing as the diametrical opposite of
eating.
SACRIFICE AS NON-EATING AND EATING AS NON-SACRIFICE
As I suggested above, the homilists construct the act of sacrifice as an act of
giving up food—and by extension giving up the gullet (=sacrificing one’s
nefesh)—and contrast this act with voracious eating, which is identified as animal-
istic. The recurring denigrations of the gullet as robbing and stealing that we find
in parashah 4, which echo the same theme in parashah 3, should be understood as
part of a greater rhetorical effort to vilify eating in order to valorize sacrifice.
Although the practice of sacrifice is never explicitly mentioned in parashah 4,
the very fact that this is the topic of the Torah portion around which it revolves
makes it implicitly present, and sets the biblical horizon against which the mid-
rashic themes unfold.
The same biblical horizon of sacrifice is also at play in parashah 5 of Levi-
ticus Rabbah, which likewise pertains to a Torah portion concerned with sacrifices,
but has very little to do with sacrifice as such. In this parashahwe find a homily on
several verses from the book of Amos, describing the overindulgent and ostenta-
tious lifestyle of the wealthy people of Samaria. The homilist expounds on the
phrase “you dine on choice lambs and fattened calves” (Amos 6:4), saying:
“when one of them would wish to have a lamb from the flock, he would pass
Epistolam I ad Timotheum, Homily 13.3–4 (Patrologia Graeca 62:569-570); Chrysostom, Mattheum,
Homily 70.4 (Patrologia Graeca 58:660).
94. Grimm, From Feasting to Fasting, 34–59; Sandnes, Belly and Body, 35–160; see also John
Coveney, Food, Morals, andMeaning: The Pleasure and Anxiety of Eating (London: Routledge, 2000),
30–55; John M. Wilkins and Shaun Hill, Food in the Ancient World (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 187–
210.
95. Grimm, From Feasting to Fasting, 114–90; Shaw, Burden of the Flesh, 79–60.
96. Eliezer Diamond, Holy Men and Hunger Artists: Fasting and Asceticism in Rabbinic
Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 121–32.
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the entire flock in front of him and choose [a particular] one and slaughter it, and if
he would wish to have a calf he would pass the entire herd in front of him, and
choose [a particular] one and slaughter it.”97 For an audience versed in the
cultic language of Leviticus, this description of the lavish feast, which stands as
an emblem of moral depravity, immediately invokes the practice of scrutinizing
the animals for sacrifice in order to choose those that are entirely unblemished,
as the sacrificial protocol requires. This is yet another example of the way in
which the homilists use the parity between sacrificing and eating—in the sub-
stances used and in the procedures applied to them—to set the two as two diver-
gent paths in which one can walk: either serving God or serving one’s gullet.98
Above we have seen other examples for the use of this parity, such as the
various stories in which poor persons give up their food in order to offer it on
the altar, the contrast of the eating priest with the sacrificing layman, and the
association of the voracious gullet with the permission to consume nonsacrificial
meat.
With this notion that the essence of sacrifice is choosing God (and thereby,
the soul) over the gullet, it was only natural to expect the parashot in Leviticus
Rabbah to contain the theme, which is indeed traceable in both rabbinic and
early Christian writings, that fasting is a form of sacrifice, and that the one who
abstains from food gives him or herself as an offering to God.99 It is quite
likely that this notion lurks at the background of the homilies we have seen, but
it is nonetheless not explicitly related. These homilies cannot be taken simply as
a means of advocating asceticism by equating it with sacrifice, since they are at
the same time advocating sacrifice by equating it with asceticism. That is to
say, the authors of the parashot both use the imagery of sacrifices to stress the
value of self-denial, and deploy the rhetoric of vilification of food to stress the
value of sacrifices.
These homilies thus offer a delicate play between themes that are pertinent
to the cultural world of the rabbis, and themes that govern the biblical text to which
97. Vayikra Rabbah, Vayikra, par. 5, to Leviticus 4:3 (ed. Margaliot, 1:105–106).
98. Of course, some sacrificial practices (most notably the Passover sacrifice) include eating as
an inseparable part of the cultic process. Interestingly, however, we can trace a sustained rhetorical
effort to distance the Passover sacrifice from gluttonous consumption of food as early as in Philo of
Alexandria’s comments on Passover, in which he emphasizes that the paschal meal is meant to
create reverence and gratitude and not to “gratify the belly” (On the Special Laws 2.148), and a
very similar effort to distinguish between “pious” consumption of the paschal meat and voracious con-
sumption (’akhilah gasah) appears in B. Horayot 10b. In a somewhat different vein, the author of the
Epistle to the Hebrews utilizes the fact the ordinary temple sacrifices ultimately serve as food for the
priests in order to denigrate those sacrifices (Hebrews 9:10), and to contrast them with the self-sacrifice
of Christ, “which those who officiate in the tent have no right to eat” (Hebrews 13:10). For this author,
then, a sacrifice that can be eaten by humans is by definition an inefficacious sacrifice.
99. Caroline Walker Bynum, Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to
Medieval Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 33–69; Grimm, From Feasting to
Fasting, 116–17; Diamond, Holy Men, 101–6. The more general notion of suffering as sacrifice
already appears in Second Temple literature, as shown by David Kraemer, Responses to Suffering in
Classical Rabbinic Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
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the homilists are committed. The Levitical text presents a world in which sacrifices
are an indispensable part; prominent intellectual and religious trends of late
antique Palestine construct a world in which food is treated with great suspicion,
if not with disdain. The homilists of Leviticus Rabbah do not replace the biblical
sacrifice with a discipline of self-mortification, but rather allow the two to work
together and to lend meaning to each other. At least in what concerns these para-
shot, then, Leviticus Rabbah should not be seen as subscribing to a supersessionist
paradigm, according to which animal and vegetable offerings can be substituted
for more “spiritual” forms of sacrifice,100 but rather as attempting to reframe sacri-
fices as such in light of contemporary moralistic models.
One might wonder why the rabbis found it necessary to advocate sacrifice
and to integrate it into the cultural system of values of their audience if sacrifices
have not been part of the Jewish landscape for hundreds of years at their time. The
answer to this may be that the rabbis could not bear to empty their religious
language of meaning. The prospect of seeing the Torah portions concerned with
sacrifices as obsolete vestiges of a world that no longer exists (much as they are
read today) was not acceptable to the rabbis, and they strove to instill new and rel-
evant meanings into these biblical institutions by enriching them with ideas and
concepts from their own contemporary world. Thus, the homiletic method of
the creators of Leviticus Rabbah should not be seen as a way of circumventing
the biblical book, but rather as a way of bringing it back to life.
Mira Balberg
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois
100. On the “supersessionist” model in the explanation of sacrifice and its problems, see
Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple, 3–13, 247–54; Ullucci, Christian Rejection of Animal
Sacrifice, 31–64.
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